We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 17:89-99, 1988) and Nowak (Int J Game Theory 26:137-141, 1997) as well as most of the characterizations by Casajus (Theory Decis 71:365-372, 2011b) are redundant. Further, we explore symmetry implications of Lehrer's 2-efficiency axiom.
Introduction
As an alternative to the Shapley (1953 ) value, Banzhaf (1965 introduced another value for voting games, later extended to general TU games by Owen (1975) . There are numerous characterizations of the Banzhaf value both on the full domain of TU games and within restricted domains. Among them, the characterizations by Lehrer (1988) stand out by the use of some appealing amalgamation properties, superadditivity, max-superadditivity, and 2-efficiency, where in particular the latter very nicely pinpoints the difference between the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value.
To illustrate this, let us explain superadditivity and 2-efficiency. When player j is amalgamated to player i in a TU game, he leaves the game as a genuine player, but he "sits on the shoulders" of player i, i.e., with respect to the creation of worth, player j is present in a coalition whenever player i is so. Superadditivity then requires the payoff of player i in the amalgamated game not to be smaller than the sum of the individual payoffs of players i and j in the original game, i.e., amalgamating players never hurts. 2-efficiency is more demanding; it calls for amalgamation not to make a difference, i.e., for equality to hold in the superadditivity axiom. In contrast, the Shapley value obeys N -efficiency, i.e., the sum of payoffs does not change when all players are merged into a single one.
Later on, Nowak (1997) and Casajus (2011b) employ 2-efficiency to characterize the Banzhaf value, but-in contrast to Lehrer-avoid the additivity axiom by invoking marginality Young (1985) or differential marginality Casajus (2011a). Besides one of the amalgamation properties and the dummy player axiom, all of the above characterizations share the symmetry axiom or differential marginality, where the latter is closely related to symmetry. While Casajus (2011b, Remark 5) claims the nonredundancy of his characterization, neither Lehrer (1988) nor Nowak (1997) check for the independence of their axioms. Embarrassingly, Casajus is wrong. In most of the above mentioned characterizations, we can drop the symmetry axiom or differential marginality.
What our authors seem to have missed is that the amalgamation properties, in particular 2-efficiency, embody strong symmetry requirements. Indeed, as our first main result (Theorem 1), we show that 2-efficiency entails isomorphism invariance, hence symmetry.
Our second main result directly builds on the first one. We establish that the axioms in the Lehrer (1988, Theorem B) characterization are not independent (Theorem 4). To achieve this, we explore relations between the amalgamation properties (Lemmas 2 and 3), which may be of some interest in themselves. First, it is quite easy to show that additivity and superadditivity imply 2-efficiency on the full domain of games (Lemma 2). And second, it is little more difficult to establish that additivity, the dummy player axiom, and max-superadditivity imply superadditivity (Lemma 3). Together with Theorem 1, this already entails that one can drop symmetry from the Lehrer characterization. In order to show the latter for Lehrer (1988, Theorem A), i.e., within the class of simple games (Theorem 5), we combine ideas of the proof of the Lehrer theorem and of the proof of our Theorem 7.
Further, we show that the Banzhaf value already is characterized by the dummy player axiom and by 2-efficiency on the full domain of TU games (Theorem 7). While
